Al-Ghazali's attitude towards Kalam (Scholastic theology)

Al-GhazÉlÊ and KalÉm


1.0 Introduction

AbË ×Émid al-GhazÉlÊ (450-505 AH/1058-1111 AD) is one of the great Muslim jurist, theologian and mystics of the Muslim world. He lived in the 12th Century. He was a polymath who wrote on a wide range of topics including jurisprudence, theology, mysticism and philosophy. He was famously known as hujjah al-IslÉm as he contributed greatly to the development of the Muslim ummah especially in theology and Sufism.
Al-GhazÉlÊ was not only of his time but also of all times, he stands out prominently as the most representative spirit of his era. Whatever he wrote bears the stamp of the age in which he lived. A knowledge of the spirit of his age will, therefore, give us a true and proper understanding of the philosophy of this remarkable man who after assimilating whatever he took from the past and from his time, bequeathed to humanity a system of thought which bears so unique an impress of his own spiritual character that it will always remain a source of inspiration to those who yearn for communication with God. The works of al-GhazÉlÊ represent a very thoughtful exposition of Islam and at the same time a critique of the anti-Islamic elements of his times.
Al-GhazÉlÊ mastered philosophy and then criticized it in order to protect religion from being innovated. Among the issues of philosophical thought which were critically discussed between al-GhazÉlÊ with other Muslim scholars and philosophers is about his criticisms on the kalÉm.

2.0 Al-GhazÉlÊ’s Background and Scholarly Life

2.1 Educational Background
AbË ×Émid MuÍammad ibn MuÍammad ibn MuÍammad al-ÙËsi al-GhazÉlÊ, an outstanding Jurist, theologian and ØËfÊ, was born in 450 AH /1058 AD at ÙËs, near the modern Mashad in KhurasÉn which prior to his time had already produced so many prominent Sufis. The District of ÙËs itself was the birthplace of many outstanding personalities and men of learning in Islam, including the poet FirdawsÊ (d.416/1025) and the state man NiÐÉm al-Muluk ( d. 485/1092), who was destined to play a significant role in the intellectual life of al-GhazÉlÊ. Among its distinguished religious scholars, al-Ghazali’s uncle al-FÉrmadhÊ (d. 477/ 1084) was also one of his famous teachers in Sufism.
Al-GhazÉlÊ received his early education in Ùus itself not long before he died, his father entrusted the education of al-GhazÉlÊ and his younger brother AÍmad (d.1126) to a pious friend. Al-GhazÉlÊ’s education included learning the Qur’Én and ÍadÊth, listening to the stories about saints, and memorizing mystical love poems. After his educational trust fund was exhausted, he was sent to a madrasah where he first learned jurisprudence from Ahmad al-RÉdhkÉnÊ.
Later, before he was fifteen years old, al-GhazÉlÊ went to JurjÉn in Mazardaran to continue his studies in jurisprudence under AbË NaÎr al-IsmÉÑÊlÊ. At seventeen, he returned home to Ùus. Before his twentieth birthday he went to Naishapur to study fiqh and kalam under al-JuwaynÊ. At this time al-GhazÉlÊ composed his first work, entitled al-MankhËl min ÑIlm al-UÎËl (A Resume of Science of Principles), on legal theory and methodology. He was appointed al-JuwaynÊ’s teaching assistant and continued to teach at NiÐÉmiyah in Naishapur until the latter died in 505/1111.
It is important to note that al-GhazÉlÊ studied kalÉm with al-JuwaynÊ (d. 478/1085). The latter played a significant role in the philosophization of AshÑarite kalÉm. This philosophization influenced al-GhazÉlÊ’s own vision and treatment of kalÉm as a discipline. Al-SubkÊ claims that al-JuwaynÊ introduced al-GhazÉlÊ to study of philosophy including logic and natural philosophy. Since al-JuwaynÊ was theologian (mutakallim), not a philosopher, he must have imparted his knowledge of philosophy through the discipline of kalÉm. Al-GhazÉlÊ was not satisfied with what he had learned from his teacher. He later wrote al-munqidh that not a single Muslim religious scholar before him had directed his attention and endeavour to a through study of philosophy. The knowledge of falsafah that he gained through his study of al-JuwaynÊ’s discourse on kalÉm and possibly through other writings as well was sufficient, however, to acquaint him with the methodological claim of the philosophers that they are the people of logic and demonstration (ahl al-manÏiq wa al-burhÉn). This is because that claim had been current since al-FÉrÉbÊ and could not have been unknown to al-JuwaynÊ, a leading intellectual opponent of the philosophers.
Another area of study which engaged al-GhazÉlÊ’s mind during his stay in Naishapur was Sufism. He studied its theory and practice under the guidance of al-FÉrmadhÊ. Al-GhazÉlÊ actually managed to unite those who were in constant discord namely the theologians and the Sufis. Thus al-GhazÉlÊ became the faqÊh of the Sufis and the most learned ØËfÊ of the fuqahÉ’. He event acquired the distinguished title of hujjah al-IslÉm and become the innovator of the whole fifth century .
Thus al-GhazÉlÊ put an end to his seclusion and resumed his lectures and his preaching. He also sought to reconcile between external and hidden matters until he died in 505 AH, in Taws, where he was buried and where his mausoleum still exist today.

2.2 Al-Ghazali’s Works
Al-GhazÉlÊ applied himself first to kalÉm while still at Naishapur. In considering al-GhazÉlÊ’s statement about kalÉm in al-Munqidh, he claims that he wrote some works on the subject during this period. He tells us that he began his quest after knowledge by the study of kalÉm, for which he contributed written works. Other major works of al-GhazÉlÊ in kalÉm are al-IqtiÎÉd fÊ al-IÑtiqÉd, al-Munqidh min al-ÖalÉl, IÍyÉ’ ÑUlËm al-DÊn and IljÉm al-ÑAwwÉm Ñan ÑIlm al-KalÉm.
During his stay in Baghdad al-GhazÉlÊ completes his promised in-depth study of the four classes of knowers. This was also his most prolific perios of writing. Having studied kalÉm and written several works on discipline, al-GhazÉlÊ devoted himself to the study of philosophy. He tells us that he studied thoroughly the writings of the philosophers without the help of a master during his hours of free time when he was not writing and lecturing on the religious sciences.
This al-GhazÉlÊ’s work, short in term of the years he actually lived (55 years) but so rich in scientific achievements. It is said that he left some 230 books most of them in religion, philosophy, Sufism and history. Among his famous ones are:
1. IÍyÉ’ ÑUlËm al-DÊn
2. Al-Munqidh min al-ÖalÉl
3. Al-IqtiÎÉd fÊ al-IÑtiqÉd
4. IljÉm al-ÑAwwÉm Ñan ÑIlm al-KalÉm
5. TahÉfut al-FalÉsifah
6. MinhÉj al-ÑÓbidÊn
7. AdÉb al-ØËfiyah
8. KitÉb al-MadnËni bihi ÑalÉ Ghairi Ahlihi
9. BidÉyah al-HidÉyah
10. TahdhÊb al-Nufus bi al-AdÉb al-SharÊÑah
11. Jawhar al-Qur’Én wa Öuraruh
12. KhulÉÎah al-TaÎnÊf
13. Al-RasÉ’il al-Qudusiyyah fÊ QawÉÑid al-ÑAqad
14. FaÌÉ’ih al-BaÏiniyyah wa FadÉ’il al-Mustadhariyyah
15. Mi’yÉr al-Haq fÊ al-ManÏiq

3.0 ÑIlm al-KalÉm
According to Corbin’s History of Islamic Philosophy, the Arabic word kalÉm signifies word or speech . The word mutakallim designates him who speaks, the orator (in grammar, the first person). It is not possible here to trace the evolution whereby the word kalÉm came to mean simply theology. And the word mutakallimËn came to mean the theologians. This would involve a more detailed analysis of the genesis of the problem, touched on below, of the Qur’Én as kalÉm Allah, the Word of God.
Al-FÉrÉbÊ defines kalÉm as a religious science which arose in a religious tradition at some point in its history out of need to formulate a systematic defense of the tenet of that religion from various attacks from various sources as he says:
KalÉm enables man to support certain ideas and acts which has been stated by God (Allah) in order to refute the contradictory.

Meanwhile al-GhazÉlÊ describes kalÉm as a tool to protect Muslim faith from innovations, as saying:
For its aim is simply to conserve the creed of the orthodox (ahl al-Sunnah) for the orthodox and to guard it from the confusion introduced by the innovators.
Therefore according to al-GhazÉlÊ, a group of the mutakallimËn did indeed perform the task assigned to the God by defending the creed which had been revealed through revelation from philosophers or atheists who against the Islamic traditions specifically in tawÍÊd and divinity (ulËhiyyÉt).
Since kalÉm contributes as an important tool in tawÍÊd specifically in Abbasid Empire, the discussions of kalÉm are critically based on the attributes of Allah, His acts, the universe, prophet hood and the science of hereafter and unseen (samÑiyyÉt).


4.0 Al-GhazÉlÊ and KalÉm

4.1 Al-GhazÉlÊ’s Criticism of KalÉm
Al-GhazÉlÊ’s criticism of kalÉm is significant. For his authority in that discipline was widely recognized. He had studied under the greatest AshÑarite theologian and mastered the works of kalÉm. He himself became the leading theologian of his time with several excellent works on the subject to his credit. According to Osman Bakar, in al-GhazÉlÊ’s criticism of the mutakallimËn, he did not deal with the different school of kalÉm in matters of its doctrine but rather the common methodological stand that they had adopted . Al-GhazÉlÊ’s criticism of kalÉm will be discussed in several points emphasizing on his comments in his works and some distinctions with other theologians in this regard.
4.1.1 KalÉm and the Degree of Knowledge
Al-GhazÉlÊ in the Book of Knowledge of the IÍyÉ’, describes seeking knowledge is an ordinance obligatory on every Muslim (farÌ Ñayn) and he criticizes the mutakallimËn who claim that study of kalÉm falls under farÌ Ñayn as saying :
People, however, disagreed as to what branch of knowledge man is obliged to acquire, and as a result split up into about twenty groups. We shall not go into details but simply summarize the matter by saying that each group insisted on the necessity of acquiring that branch of knowledge to every Muslim (farÌ Ñayn) which happened to be its specialty. The scholastic theologians (mutakallimËn) insisted on scholastic theology because the unity of Allah, as well as His essence and attributes, is known through it.

In contrast, al-GhazÉlÊ himself treated kalÉm as farÌ kifÉyah, when defining kalÉm as a tool to protect religion from innovations not an end. He says:
….then know that all that theology offers in the way of useful evidence is contained in the Qur’Én and tradition. Whatever evidence is not contained therein is either reprehensible argumentation [which, as will be seen, is an innovation] or mere wrangling by dwelling on distinctions or amplification through the array of different opinions, most of which are derived and nonsense, despised by the mind and rejected by the ears, while others are ramblings into things unrelated to religion and not customary during the first period of Islam. To enter, into such discussions at all was then regarded heresy, but things have now changed. Innovations which turn people from the dictates of the Qur’Én and the tradition have arisen and a group has emerged who made imitations of the Book and the ÍadÊth and based upon it false speculation, so that certain dangerous things have necessarily become permissible; they have become as binding as the farÌ kifÉyah. To such an extent would an innovator go whenever he purposes to preach a heresy.

Al-GhazÉlÊ accepts kalÉm as is not an end in itself and it is error to think that the mere engagement in it constitutes the experientially religious or that it is always needed for attaining salvation in the hereafter. Its role is very much akin to that of the armed guards protecting the pilgrims’ caravan against Bedouins marauders. It is needed, but only as a means to an end. Again, it is like medicine, which at times is certainly needed. But when not needed, or when needed but not properly administered, it can be very harmful. Thus it is not incumbent on all Muslims. It is a farÌ kifÉyah. Hence every region should have a mutakallimËn, a theologian, to defend Muslim faith.
Al-GhazÉlÊ also divides knowledge into religious and intellectual knowledge . All religious knowledge is praiseworthy which falls under two categories: farÌ Ñayn and farÌ kifÉyah. According to him, the category of farÌ kifÉyah religious knowledge includes: (1) the science of the sources of religious knowledge and (2) the science of jurisprudence which forms a part of the science of the branches. Therefore, sciences like ÑulËm al-Qur’Én (the science of Quranic interpretation), ÑulËm al-ÍadÊth, uÎËl al-fiqh belong to this category. Another important example of farÌ kifÉyah religious knowledge is kalÉm. FarÌ kifÉyah in this category is only within a certain limit which al-GhazÉlÊ calls “the limit of sufficiency”. He says:
The sciences whose knowledge is praiseworthy up to a certain limit are those which we have already mentioned under the sciences the acquisition of whose knowledge is farÌ kifÉyah.

Al-GhazÉlÊ at the same time puts also kalÉm in intellectual knowledge along with philosophy which comprises four chapters. The second and third are included under kalÉm as he says:
The second is logic which is a study of the nature of evidence and its conditions as well as the nature of a definition and its conditions. Both of these are included under theology. The third is divinity which is the science of the being and attributes of Allah. This also is included under theology.

The above discussion shows the significant of kalÉm in ÑaqÊdah as has been described by al-GhazÉlÊ according to his observation on that matter in terms of its function and the methodological concept which will be discussed later. It is clearly can be understood of his statement “farÌ kifÉyah in this category only within a certain limit which is called the limit of sufficiency” which differs one to another.

4.1.2 The Aim of KalÉm
Al-GhazÉlÊ approves the aim of kalÉm and its role in society, namely the defense of the common religious beliefs of the community by repelling errors and heresies and removing doubt and confusion relating to those beliefs. He even praised the mutakallimËn, describing them as people who had been inspired by God to champion orthodoxy by kalÉm designed to disclose the deceptions introduced by the contriving innovators contrary to traditional orthodoxy. KalÉm has its root in the Qur’Én and ÍadÊth. He says:
For its aim is simply to conserve the creed of the orthodox (ahl al-Sunnah) for the orthodox and to guard it from the confusion introduced by the innovators.

However, al-GhazÉlÊ was highly critical of certain aspects of the methodology of kalÉm. He considers the methods of kalÉm to be defective both to satisfy his thirst for knowledge of the reality of things and to inflict intellectual defeat opponents of kalÉm. He says:
But since that was the aim of their own science, their discussion of the subject was not the aim of their own science, their discussion of the subject was not thoroughgoing; therefore it did not provide an effective means of dispelling entirely the darkness due to the bewilderment about the differences dividing man.

Al-GhazÉlÊ clearly indicates that kalÉm is not the only way to protect religion because it’s only considered as a mean to an end and the above shows that al-Ghazali’s attitude towards kalÉm seems that this did not necessarily have to be so. It might be said that since kalÉm involves in philosophical discussions, the aim of kalÉm cannot be achieved for all community and logical arguments will only tend to be applicable to the level of taqlÊd. But for al-GhazÉlÊ it is supposed to be practical for all community.
Therefore al-GhazÉlÊ concludes that kalÉm did not provide him with the certainty in knowledge he was seeking, instead other factor can be utilized in order to obtain the aim of protecting religion (ÑaqÊdah) from being deviated. Moreover, according to al-GhazÉlÊ’s experience in dealing with kalÉm and Sufism, he believes that kalÉm partially fulfilled its aim but did not satisfy what he was striving after, but Sufism (kashÉf) is the proper way to that aim because it consists of the theory and practical as well. He says:
I knew with certainty that the Sufis were masters of states, not purveyors of words, and that I had learned all I could by way of theory. There remained, then only what was attainable, not by hearing and study, but by fruitional experience and actually engaging in the way. From the sciences which I had practiced and the method which I had followed in my inquiry into the two kinds of knowledge, revealed and rational, I had already acquired a sure and certain faith in God most high, in prophetic mediation of revelation and in the Last Day.

In fact, al-GhazÉlÊ affirmed the important and a need for kalÉm within the Islamic community to the end of his life, but he also believed that the scope of its relevance and usefulness was limited only for the case dictates under necessity. One would successfully strengthen his ÑaqÊdah without it.

4.1.3 Methodological basis of KalÉm
Al-GhazÉlÊ criticizes the methodology of kalÉm from two points of view. First, he accepts school of kalÉm and even affirms its necessity (as farÌ kifÉyah). But he criticizes the inadequacy its methodological tools to confront its intellectual opponents. Second, he criticizes kalÉm from the point of view of a seeker after a direct spiritual experience of God and inner reality of things.
According to al-GhazÉlÊ, the mutakallimËn were orthodox because they subordinated reason to revelation. But the use of reason in kalÉm had not been exercised to the fullest extent possible. He saw much scope for improvement in kalÉm’s methodology. He was not against the borrowing premises from the opponents of kalÉm, but in so doing the mutakallimËn relied on premises which they took over from their adversaries, being compelled to admit them either by uncritical acceptance, or because of the community’s consensus, or by simple acceptance deriving from the Qur’Én or traditions (ÍadÊths). Most of their polemic was devoted to bringing out the inconsistencies of their adversaries and criticizing them for the logically absurd consequences of what they conceded. But this approach for al-GhazÉlÊ is of little use for one who admits only necessary truths. He goes on:
So kalÉm was not sufficient in my case, nor was it remedy for the malady of which I was complaining.

Then al-GhazÉlÊ continues :
To be sure, when the discipline of kalÉm acquired some status and had been engages in for some length of time, the mutakallimËn showed an earnest desire for attempting to defend orthodoxy by the study of the true natures of things. They plunged into the study of substances and accident and their principles. But since that was the aim of their own science, their discussion of the subject was not the aim of their own science, their discussion of the subject was not thoroughgoing; therefore it did not provide an effective means of dispelling entirely the darkness due to the bewilderment about the differences dividing man.

The above statement indicates the usage the philosophical terminologies of mutakallimËn such as haqÉ’iq al-umËr, jawhar and ÑaraÌ had been involved in the discussion which lead to further discussions and debates on that terms without focusing on the aim of kalÉm itself. Hence, al-GhazÉlÊ says, “They plunged into the study of substances and accident and their principles”.
By the adversaries of kalÉm, al-GhazÉlÊ means the philosophers. Osman Bakar states, al-GhazÉlÊ’s patroyal of kalÉm as a discipline that had become influenced by falsafah was confirmed later authorities like ShahrastÉnÊ, Maimonides and Ibn KhladËn. Concerning premises borrowed from philosophers, could be referred to atomism and also reason and faith. He then criticized his contemporary mutakallimËn for being too closed bound in their views to previous authorities in kalÉm, like al-AshÑarÊ and al-BÉqilÉnÊ, even in matters relating to premises and proofs.

Al-GhazÉlÊ found defects in the mutakallimËn’s use of syllogism. To remedy this defect, he wrote several works on Aristotelian logic in a manner that had not been attempt before by any jurist or theologian. Al-GhazÉlÊ also considered undesirable the mutakallimËn’s emphasis on the logical inconsistencies in the arguments of their opponents, instead, says al-GhazÉlÊ, they should concentrate on the refutation of the fundamental doctrines of their opponents, insofar as these doctrines were viewed as heretical. The TahÉfut was seen as advocating this new approach of kalÉm. Referring to al-GhazÉlÊ’s view, the methodology of kalÉm was comprised of faith (ÊmÉn) and ratiocination tainted by false syllogism.
Thus, al-GhazÉlÊ describes the Sufis as those who claim that they alone enter into the Divine Presence, and as men of mystic vision (mushÉhadah) and illumination (mukÉshafah). The ØËfÊ is thus presented as an intimate witness of God. The ØËfÊ way of witness is described as authentic vision and the unveiling of the mysteries. According to al-GhazÉlÊ, to witness the Divine Presence is to attain the highest possible state of spiritual experience. He says :
From the very start of the way revelations (al-mukÉshafah) and visions (al-MushÉhadah) begin, so that, even when awake, the Sufis see the angels and the spirits of the prophets and hear voices coming from them and learn useful thing from them. Then their “state” ascends from the vision of forms and likenesses to stages beyond the narrow range or words: so if anyone tries to express them, his word contain evident error against which he cannot guard himself.

Since al-GhazÉlÊ was himself a distinguished ØËfÊ, he was able to give an authentic and authoritative account of the ØËfÊ methodology. He considers the Sufis method is the most excellent of methods and the Sufis the most excellent of the knowers of the truth. He himself found the light of certainty in the spiritual path of the Sufis. In Sufism there is a whole knowledge associated with this goal comprising theory as well as practical.
In a nutshell, al-GhazÉlÊ accepts the role of kalÉm in which it suitable for some people particularly the common ones, but the inadequacy of kalÉm still prevails. As far as he is concerned, kalÉm did not provide certitude knowledge (Ñilm al-yaqÊn) rather than Sufism.

4.1.4 KalÉm, TaqlÊd and MaÑrifah (kashÉf)
Al-GhazÉlÊ argues, the one who is obedient who controls his appetites, directing his thought solely to attaining one of reality (ÍaqÊqah min ÍaqÉ’iq) may not have this reality revealed to him. This is because of his being veiled from it by a previous belief that has come to him from youth, by way of taqlÊd and the reception from others in good faith (Íusn al-Ðann). This is also, he goes on, “is a great veil by which the majority of the theologians (akthar al-mutakallimÊn) and partisan of sectarian doctrines (al-mutaÑaÎÎibÊn li al-madhÉhib) are veiled”. This is because they are veiled by “imitative beliefs (iÑtiqÉd al-taqlÊdiyyah) that solidified in their souls, and became fixed in their heart, becoming a veil between them and the apprehension of realities (al-haqÉÑiq).
Al-GhazÉlÊ goes on with his discussion, it becomes even more explicit that the realities, the objects of knowledge that yield certainty, belong to the world of the unseen, the divine realm (ÑÉlam al-malakËt) as distinct from the domain of the seen (ÑÉlam al-mulk). Al-GhazÉlÊ however, also then speaks of both ÑÉlam al-mulk and ÑÉlam al-malakËt, when taken together. This, for al-GhazÉlÊ, constitutes the lordly, divine, presence (al-haÌrah al-rubËbiyyah) which encompasses all the existence, since there is nothing in existence except God, exalted be He, and His acts, His kingdom and servants being among His acts. For some people, what is revealed of this to the heart constitutes paradise itself. For those who follow the truth, however, the revelation (al-tajallÊ) is the cause for deserving paradise in hereafter. Moreover, the degree to which this tajallÊ is attained in this life determines the measure of reward in the hereafter. This tajallÊ and belief (imÉn), al-GhazÉlÊ states this is the first of three levels:
The first is belief of the commonality (al-ÑawwÉm). This is belief based on pure taqlÊd. The second is the belief of the theologians (mutakallimËn) which is mixed with some kind of inference. Its level is close to the belief of the common people. The third is the belief of the Gnostics (ÊmÉn al-ÑÉrifÊn). This consists of seeing with the light of certainty (kashÉf).

Al-GhazÉlÊ illustrates these levels of belief by an example, namely, that “your belief that Zayd is in the house which has three levels”, the first, as he says :
The first is that you are informed by you and you have always experienced to be truthful. Your heart acquiesces to him, and you are assured by the information simple by hearing it. This is belief by sheer taqlÊd, exemplifies the belief of the common people. For when they arrived at the age of discernment, they would have heard from their fathers and mothers about the existence of God, exalted be He, His knowledge, will, power and the rest of His attributes, the sending of His messengers, their verasity and what they have conveyed. This becomes a belief firmly established in their hearts and in which they become rest assured. What is contrary to what their mothers, fathers and teachers have taught them never crosses their mind. This belief is cause of salvation (al-najÉ) in the hereafter. The adherers of his belief are among the first of the ranks of the people of the right (aÎÍÉb al-yamÊn) but not among those drawn close to God (al-muqarrabËn), because in this belief there is no unveiling, insight and the opening of the breast by the light of certainty.

According to the above, clearly mentions the position of taqlÊd among common people (al-ÑawwÉm) represents the least level in ÑaqÊdah. For the second level of belief that is mutakallimËn, he describes:
The second is for you to hear the speech and voice of Zayd (for instance) from inside in the house, but from behind a wall. You would infer from this that he is in the house. Thus your assent, belief and certainty that he is the house would be stronger than your assent due to the sheer hearing (from that Zayd’s is in the house). For, if you are told that he is in the house and then you hear his voice, you would then become more certain (that he is in the house) because voices at a time when he has seen the visage. His heart then judges that is the voice of that individual. This is belief mixed with inference. It is possible, however, for error to enter into this. For one voice may be similar to another and this can be artificially undertaken by way of imitation.

For the second level i.e mutakallimËn, al-GhazÉlÊ indicates kalÉm plays important part for commonality in protecting ÑaqÊdah and more assured than the first, but for him the true knowledge can be achieved by maÑrifah Allah i.e kashÉf. For that, he gives his analogy:
The third level is for you to enter house and look at (Zayd) with your eye and see him. This is true knowledge and seeing with certitude. This is similar to the gnosis (maÑrifah) of those drawn close to God and the ardently veracious (tushbih maÑrifah al-muqarrabÊn wa al-ÎiddiqÊn). Within their belief is enveloped the belief of the commonality and mutakallimËn but is differentiated from it by a clear characteristic that renders the possibility of error not possible.

According to the above, al-GhazÉlÊ’s Ihya’ explains that belief of kalÉm is lower than gnosis (maÑrifah). This is based on al-GhazÉlÊ’s experience as theologian and ØËfÊ. M.E. Marmura clarifies that the same discussion also can be found in KitÉb al-ArbaÑÊn fÊ UÎËl al-DÊn which gives frank expression of the knowledge (maÑrifah) of the truth of the ÑaqÊdah.
Al-GhazÉlÊ maintains that maÑrifah is true knowledge and applicable to achieve the highest level in the kind of certitude, which is mentioned in the Qur’Én as haqq al-yaqÊn. It seems that al-GhazÉlÊ subordinates reason to intuition (kashÉf or maÑrifah) which indicates that religious knowledge (revelation) is superior than the intellectual knowledge (reason).

4.1.5 MutakallimËn and Salaf
Before turning to al-Ghazali’s attitude towards mutakallimun and Salaf, we have to have a clear vision about Salaf (or Salafiyyah) and mutakallimun, hence, we have to refer to some terminologies in it. According to Salaf (the Pious Ancestor), theology is designated by the term uÎËl al-dÊn meaning literally the sources or principles of religion, on the analogy of uÎËl fiqh meaning the sources or principles of law, and hence legal theory and methodology. However another term which came to designate theology is kalÉm. But this term is reserved by traditionalist theologian (Salafiyyah) to designate only that type of theology indulged in by rationalist (mutakallimËn). Whereas the mutakallimËn uses both terms interchangeably, equating kalÉm with uÎËl al-dÊn, the Salafiyyah regards uÎËl al-dÊn as the only legitimate king of theology, and condemns kalÉm and its partisans as outside the pale of orthodoxy. Anti- kalÉm literature abounds in the writings of Salafiyyah. To a Salafiyyah, a legitimate theologian is who one belongs to ahl al-ÍadÊth, the partisans of tradition, who set themselves against ahl al-kalÉm, the partisans of kalÉm, singly designated as mutakallim, that is a kalÉm expert.
The distinction between a traditionalist and rationalist may best be illustrated in their respective attitude with regard to divine attributes. The MuÑtazilites, who have been called the first rationalist of Islam, denied the divine attributes: thus they were called muÑaÏillah or partisans of taÑÏÊl, meaning the denudation of God of His attributes. The MuÑtazilites were the first users of kalÉm. They did away with the divine attributes by the use of metaphorical interpretation (ta’wÊl). The Salafiyyah, who upheld the divine attributes were called Îifatiyyah, because they affirmed the attributes (ithbÉt al-ÎifÉt). They opposed and censured kalÉm and ta’wÊl.
AshÑarite, as the MutakallimËn even though denied MuÑtazilites’s kalam, but still apply ta’wil as an approach in kalÉm in different way. AshÑarite school was founded in the middle of fourth/ten century by AbË al-×asan al-AshÑarÊ. He made up of many followers who admired his exemplary life, his thinking steeped in religious values. His followers found him a refuge both against the narrow literalism of the man of ÍadÊth and against the excessive rationalism of the MuÑtazilies. In this way, AshÑarism began to shape in the life of master.
In the seventh/thirteenth century, AshÑarism came up against adversaries of considerable stature in the person of Ibn Taymiyah who over the centuries became the father of Salafiyyah movement, denied that AshÑarism had a valid Sunni reform. He proclaimed an integral reform of Sunism, based principally on the absolute value of the literal text of the Qur’an and ÍadÊth. They were also known as ahl al-ÍadÊth consider kalÉm is unlawful such as MÉlik bin Anas, AÍmad ibn ×anbal, SufyÉn al-ThaurÊ and al-ShÉfiÑÊ.
Concerning al-GhazÉlÊ’s discussion on kalÉm, Makdisi observed that al-GhazÉlÊ’s hostile towards kalÉm is well-known. His work entitled IljÉm al-‘AwwÉm ‘am ‘Ilm al- KalÉm was the source of embarrassment to Ash’arite kalÉm. It could be seen in his reference to ShÉfiÑÊ in the Ihya’ as prohibiting kalÉm is evident and evolves from a desire to be conciliatory to s deep feeling of vindictiveness. He reported that al-KarÉbisÊ says:
Al- ShÉfiÑÊ says: “If men but knew what predilections lurk in scholastic theology they would have run away from it as they would run away from a lion.” And again he says: “Whenever I hear a man say that the name is the thing named, I testify that he is a scholastic theologian and has no religion.”
Al-GhazÉlÊ accepts the fact that some people might find their thirst for knowledge and certitude quenched by the science of kalÉm. But as far as he is concerned, kalÉm could not deliver the certitude that he sought. Al-GhazÉlÊ seems to be asserting that the spiritual and intellectual needs of man are not the same for all individuals.
There is some validity in the claim that the mutakallimËn were man of sound reasoning if they are contrasted with those who had been collectively called the ahl al-taqlÊd. These later groups were opposed to the use of reason in explaining religious belief. They condemned rational discussion in matters of faith as innovation (bidÑah) and sin. . That is what al-GhazÉlÊ understood from his own examanation of the Salaf sayings. Furthermore, al-GhazÉlÊ makes it quite clear that ShÉfiÑÊ himself was against kalÉm.
Then al-GhazÉlÊ accepts the way of truth towards aqidah is the methodology of Salaf which is taken directly from the Qur’Én and ÍadÊth, He says:
The truth is clearly what has been brought by al-Salaf (i.e referring to al-ØahÉbah and al-TÉbiÑÊn) those who demonstrate views and evidences (based on revelation) are absolutely truth.

Al-GhazÉlÊ’s IljÉm al-‘AwwÉm explains the purpose of his writing is to elaborate the methodology of Salaf and those who against them (bidÑah). Salaf’s methodology is referring to methodology of ØahÉbah and TÉbi’Ên in ÑaqÊdah which consists of seven requirements (i.e al-taqdÊs (sanctification), al-taÎdÊq (affirmative), al-‘itirÉf (recognition), al-sukËt (silenceness), al-imsÉk (evasion), al-kaff (prevention) and al-taslÊm (submission). For example, al-GhazÉlÊ explain al-taqdÊs as he says:
Al-taqdÊs (sanctification) means to deny everything which Allah has denied Himself (in the Qur’Én or ÍadÊth), whilst believing its fully perfect opposite with His Attributes like describing Him in a manner or attributes equal to Human or other creatures like Allah has body as human being’s.

Then al-GhazÉlÊ describes al-taÎdÊq (affirmative), which affirms the attributes of Allah what He deserves without any distortion (taÍrÊf) or denial (taÑÏÊl). He says:
Al-taÎdÊq (affirmation) of everything that Allah affirmed for Himself in His Book, or which His Messenger, affirmed for Him without distorting (taÍrÊf), without denial (taÑÏÊl), and without saying how they are (takyÊf) and without making any resemblance with the creation (tamthÊl).

Al-GhazÉlÊ also describes that we have to confess the attributes of Allah. The Might and Magnificent are only to be spoken of in accordance with a text (tawfÊqiyyah). So nothing is affirmed or denied for Him accept what which Allah affirmed or denied for Himself or which was affirmed by His Messenger. Every name confirmed for Allah, the Might, Majestic, is inclusive of an attribute, but the opposite is not the case. We are also required to abstain ourselves with regard to vague terms which are not found to be affirmed or denied textually, in wording or meaning, so further explanation is sought. Then if something false is meant by it, then we declare Allah free of that and reject it, and if something that is true and not to be denied for Allah, then it is accepted and the correct terminology as found in the text is to be made clear.
However, al-Ghazali accepts kalÉm only for the case of necessity within a certain limit which al-GhazÉlÊ calls “the limit of sufficiency” which has been previously discussed in farÌ kifÉyah knowledge. He says:
…theology offers in the way of useful evidence is contained in the Qur’Én and tradition. Whatever evidence is not contained therein is either reprehensible argumentation [which, as will be seen, is an innovation] or mere wrangling by dwelling on distinctions or amplification through the array of different opinions, most of which are derived and nonsense, despised by the mind and rejected by the ears, while others are ramblings into things unrelated to religion and not customary during the first period of Islam. To enter, into such discussions at all was then regarded heresy, but things have now changed. Innovations which turn people from the dictates of the Qur’Én and the tradition have arisen and a group has emerged who made imitations of the Book and the ÍadÊth and based upon it false speculation, so that certain dangerous things have necessarily become permissible.

Regarding al-GhazÉlÊ attitude towards kalÉm, it seems al-GhazÉlÊ accepted the methodology of Salaf in dealing directly with the Qur’Én and ÍadÊth instead of using philosophical arguments and terminologies in ÑaqÊdah. However, it does not mean he rejected totally the approaches of kalÉm but it rather suitable in the case of necessity in which al-GhazÉlÊ himself learned deeply kalÉm for such integral purpose.


4.2 Conclusion
Al-GhazÉlÊ’s study of kalÉm affirms the superiority of Sufism over any other modes of maÑrifah but he remained attached to the kalÉm perspective. His internal criticism of kalÉm was aimed at refining the rational approaches towards ÑaqÊdah.
Al-GhazÉlÊ as a theologian he subordinates reason to the revelation and at the same time he as a ØËfÊ subordinates reason to a mystical intuition (kashÉf). As far as he is concerned, kalÉm did not provide certitude knowledge (Ñilm al-yaqÊn) rather than Sufism and its role plays only in the limit of sufficiency.


5.0 Conclusion
In al-GhazÉlÊ’s discussion on kalÉm, some arguments have been discussed in order to point out his attitude towards kalÉm and the justification lies behind it. As the authority scholar (theologian) in kalÉm, al-GhazÉlÊ tried to refine the rational method which subordinates to revelation in proper manner based on his observation and dealing with mutakallimËn , philosophers and the community.
According to al-GhazÉlÊ, a group of the mutakallimËn did indeed perform the task assigned to the God by defending the creed and protecting religion from being innovated. But as far as he was concerned, kalÉm is not an end, it is only a tool to protect religion. Hence, It is needed, but only as a means to an end, like medicine, which at times is certainly needed. But when not needed, or when needed but not properly administered, it can be very harmful. Therefore he considers kalÉm as farÌ kifÉyah knowledge.
Al-GhazÉlÊ observed that kalÉm did not provide him with the certainty in knowledge he was seeking, instead his experience in dealing with kalÉm and Sufism, he believes that kalÉm partially fulfilled its aim but did not satisfy what he was striving after, but Sufism (kashÉf) is the proper way to that aim because it consists of both; the theory and practical.
In term of the methodology of kalÉm al-GhazÉlÊ viewed it from two points of view. First, he accepts school of kalÉm and even affirms its necessity (as farÌ kifÉyah). But he criticizes the inadequacy its methodological tools to confront its intellectual opponents. Second, he criticizes kalÉm from the point of view of a seeker after a direct spiritual experience of God and inner reality of things (in Sufism).
Al-GhazÉlÊ accepts the role of kalÉm in which it suitable for some people particularly the common ones, but the inadequacy of kalÉm still prevails. For him, kalÉm did not provide certitude knowledge (Ñilm al-yaqÊn) rather than Sufism.
Then al-GhazÉlÊ described the level of people in ÑaqÊdah could be divided into three: (1) taqlÊd (for commonality), (2) mutakallimËn, (3) maÑrifah (kashÉf). For him, kalam is applicable for the first two of these levels, but not for maÑrifah which could be achieved in Sufism. Al-GhazÉlÊ maintains that maÑrifah is true knowledge and applicable to achieve the highest level in the kind of certitude, It seems that al-GhazÉlÊ subordinates reason to intuition (kashÉf or maÑrifah) which indicates that religious knowledge (revelation) is superior than the intellectual knowledge (reason).
Regarding al-GhazÉlÊ’s observation on kalÉm (mutakallimËn) and Salaf , it seems that al-GhazÉlÊ accepted the methodology of Salaf which dealing directly with the Qur’Én and ÍadÊth instead of using philosophical arguments and terminologies in ÑaqÊdah. However, it does not mean he rejected totally the approaches of kalÉm but it rather suitable in the case of necessity in the limit of sufficiency.
As a conclusion for the whole discussion on al-GhazÉlÊ and kalÉm, it shows the significant and the role of kalÉm in Islam over the centuries. In order to develop and strengthen Islamic faith, some questions can be aroused: (1) Is the discussion of kalÉm still significant (relevant) for the present time? (2) If relevant, does it need some changes in its methodology for instance or some contents in kalÉm? (3) If not relevant, what is the proper way to study ÑaqÊdah due to need of the community today?